The game is built on classic and modern research on common resources, institutions, and cooperation
The Fishing Game is based on classic and modern research in the economics of common-pool resources, cooperation, and institutional governance. It connects Garrett Hardin’s idea of the Tragedy of the Commons with Elinor Ostrom’s empirical work showing that communities can independently develop sustainable rules and governance institutions.
The model also draws on bioeconomic approaches (Schaefer, Clark) — describing the dynamics of renewable resources — and on research about cooperation mechanisms (Axelrod), which explains how trust, reciprocity, and sanctions shape sustainable behavior in groups. Experiments on common-pool resource management confirm that communication, transparency, and clear rules radically improve joint decision-making.
The game is designed as a practical tool that turns these theories into lived experience. It lets players test institutional principles — seeing how rules, agreements, and enforcement can transform conflicts of interest into long-term cooperation and sustainable resource use.
"The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968)
Formulates the dilemma of overuse of the commons.
"Governing the Commons" (1990)
How communities develop working rules and institutions.
Fisheries and bioeconomic models
Harvest functions, sustainable yield, regulation.
"The Evolution of Cooperation"
Mechanisms of cooperation (reciprocity, reputation, sanctions).
Common-Pool Resources
Empirical evidence on penalties/incentives and the role of communication and transparency.
| EN | RU | LV |
|---|---|---|
| Tragedy of the Commons | Трагедия общих ресурсов | Kopienu traģēdija |
| Common-pool resources | Ресурсы общего пользования | Koplietošanas resursi |
| Agent-based modeling | Агент-ориентированное моделирование | Aģentbāzēta modelēšana |
| Fish stock | Рыбные запасы | Zivju krājumi |
| Maximum sustainable yield | Максимальный устойчивый вылов | Maksimālais ilgtspējīgas ieguves apjoms |
| Fishing effort | Интенсивность рыболовства | Zvejas intensitāte |
| Overfishing | Перелов | Pārzveja |
| Coordination & rules | Координация и правила | Koordinācija un noteikumi |
| Communication & transparency | Коммуникация и прозрачность | Komunikācija un caurskatāmība |
| Sanctions (enforcement) | Санкции | Sankcijas |
| Spawning | Нерест | Nārsts |
| Debriefing | Дебрифинг | Debrīfings |